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IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES v. AVCO
CORPORATION: WAS A VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS DUE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration as a mechanism for resolving commercial dis-
putes has become increasingly popular in the last several de-
cades. It is generally faster, less expensive, and more efficient
than litigation.' Litigation is especially complex when the dis-
pute involves international parties. "The foreign court can be
an alien environment for a businessman because of his unfa-
miliarity with the procedure which may be followed, the laws
to be applied, and even the mentality of foreign judges." On
the other hand, in international commercial arbitration, the
parties can decide where the claims should be disputed, and
which law should be applied.3
Once arbitration awards are rendered, the parties often
seek to have the decision enforced in other countries. Arbitral
awards are recognized and enforced more readily in United
States courts than are judgments rendered by foreign courts.4
The mechanism that provides for the enforcement of foreign
arbitration awards is the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
1. Joseph T. McLaughlin & Laurie Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Under the New York Convention - Practice in the U.S. Courts, 3 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 249, 250 (1986). But see Bryan J. Holzberg, Panel Critical of Arbitration
Cases, 19 LITIG. NEWS 10 (1993). There are those who believe that the strengths
of arbitration-its swiftness and its inexpensiveness-have been weakened by the
existence of lengthy, detailed appellate review of arbitration awards. Id.
2. ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958 1 (1981).
3. Id.
4. McLaughlin & Cenevro, supra note 1, at 250.
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commonly referred to as the New York Convention.5 The Con-
vention was ratified by many countries, including the United
States, and affirms that foreign arbitration awards are recog-
nizable and enforceable in international courts;6 but it also
defines some exceptions to the general rule of enforceability.!
Article V(1)(b) provides that where there has been a violation
of due process, the arbitral award is not enforceable.8
Disputes between nationals of the United States and Iran
are arbitrated by the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal,
which was established by the Algiers Accords9 as a conse-
quence of the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis.0 In
1988, in a dispute between Iran Aircraft Industries and Avco
Corporation, an American company, the Tribunal returned an
award in favor of the Iranian party." Thereafter, Iran Air-
craft Industries sought to have the award enforced in the Unit-
ed States, per the New York Convention. 2 This attempt was
denied both by the District Court of Connecticut,"3 and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." The Second Circuit
held that the American party, Avco Corporation, was denied
due process and consequently the award was unenforceable. 5
This Comment is concerned with the Second Circuit deci-
sion," in which enforcement of a foreign arbitration award
rendered by the United States-Iran Claim Tribunal was denied
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
6. Id. art. III.
7. Id. art. V; see also infra note 95 and part II.E.
8. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(b).
9. The Algiers Accords include: (1) the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 3 (1983), 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981) [hereinafter General Declaration]; and, (2) the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 1
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (1983), 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981) [hereinafter Claims Settle-
ment Declaration].
10. See infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
11. Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Indus., 19 Iran-U.S Cl. Trib. Rep. 200 (1988).
12. New York Convention, supra note 5.
13. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., No. 5:91 Civ. 286 (D. Conn. Dec. 10,
1991).
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enforcement in the United States. Until this case, "no federal
or foreign case appears to have used Article V(1)(b)'s narrow
exception as a reason to refuse to enforce an arbitral
award ....
The Comment begins by providing the historical and factu-
al background of the arbitration mechanism set up between
the United States and Iran and the enforcement of arbitration
awards in international law. It will describe the Algiers Ac-
cords, which created the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal,
the New York Convention, and its operation on decisions ren-
dered by the Tribunal. The Comment will trace the courts'
application of the "due process" defense as a mechanism to
challenge enforcement of arbitration decisions. The next sec-
tion of the Comment will provide the relevant facts and the
procedural history of Iran Aircraft Industries, followed by an
analysis of the Second Circuit's opinion. The case is analyzed
from four perspectives: whether the facts are compatible with a
denial of due process, whether the decision of denial of due
process is consistent with other decisions, whether or not deni-
al of due process should be relevant here, and whether this
case was subject to a stricter scrutiny.
Based on a review of the court's opinion and an analysis of
other cases in which the due process defense was raised, this
Comment concludes that there was no violation of due process
in this case. The Second Circuit, perhaps because of the emo-
tional background of this issue, subjected this case to a higher
level of scrutiny than other cases presenting the same issue of
due process.
II. BACKGROUND: THE UNITED STATES-IRAN CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
A. The Algiers Accords and the Creation of the United States-
Iran Claims Tribunal
The United States Claims Tribunal was created by the
Algiers Accords," which were a consequence of the resolution
of the Iranian hostage crisis. On November 14, 1979, the
American Embassy in Tehran was seized, and United States
17. Id. at 147 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
18. Algiers Accords, supra note 9.
445
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diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage. Presi-
dent Carter, acting pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 9 declared a national emergency and
blocked the transfer of Iranian property, and interests in prop-
erty, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and au-
thorized the Secretary of the Treasury to carry out this pro-
cess. 0 On November 15, 1979, the Treasury Department is-
sued the Iranian Asset Control Regulations which provided
that "unless licensed or authorized.., any attachment, judg-
ment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial
process is null and void with respect to any property in which
on or since [November 14, 1979] there existed an interest of
Iran."2'
In January of 1981 the governments of the United States
and Iran entered into an agreement calling for the release of
the American hostages and the settlement of any claims that
may have arisen out of the crisis. The agreement was embod-
ied in two declarations of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria: The Declaration of the Government of the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and the Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran.21 Collectively, these two docu-
ments are referred to as the Algiers Accords.' On January
19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of Executive Orders
implementing the terms of the agreement.24 Subsequently, on
January 20, 1981, the American hostages were released.
The agreement stated that:
It is the purpose of both parties ... to terminate all litigation
as between the government of each party and the nationals of
the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination
of all such claims through binding arbitration .... ITihe
United States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in
United States courts involving claims of United States per-
19. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1976).
20. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); see also E. Systems,
Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271 (1983).
21. 273 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980).
22. Algiers Accords, supra note 9.
23. Algiers Accords, supra note 9.
24. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,913-7,931 (1982).
446 [Vol. XX:2
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sons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises,
to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to
prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to
bring about the termination of such claims through binding
arbitration."
The Accords called for the establishment of the United States-
Iran Claims Tribunal to hear disputes,26 and declared that
the Tribunal would have jurisdiction over claims arising out of
contractual arrangements between the two countries, or na-
tionals of the two countries, for the purchase and the sale of
goods and services.2 Furthermore, the Accords provided that
the Tribunal would consist of nine members-three from the
United States, three from Iran, and three to be picked by those
other six.2" Claims could be decided by the full Tribunal or by
a panel of three.2 One billion dollars would be held in the
Bank of England, in the account of the Algerian Central Bank,
and would be used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by
the Claims Tribunal.0 Finally, Article IV of the Claims Set-
tling Declaration of the Accords provided that "[aill decisions
and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.,
31
On February 24, 1981, President Reagan issued an execu-
tive order which ratified the January 19 executive orders of
President Carter. In Reagan's executive order, he suspended
all claims pending in the United States that could be presented
to the Tribunal, holding that such claims would cease to have
legal effect.
33
Suspension of all pending claims in the United States was
25. General Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3, 20
I.L.M. at 224.
26. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at
9, 20 I.L.M. at 230.
27. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at
9-10, 20 I.L.M. at 230-31.
28. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at
10, 20 I.L.M. at 231-32.
29. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at
10, 20 I.L.M. at 231-32.
30. General Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 5-6, 20
I.L.M. at 226.
31. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at
10, 20 I.L.M. at 232.
32. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
33. Id.
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met with hostility by companies who had actions pending in
United States courts against Iran. Questions arose regarding
the various executive orders and actions undertaken by Presi-
dent Carter, the Secretary of the Treasury, and President Rea-
gan. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 4 the corporation petitioner
had filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks alleging
that it was owed a certain amount of money for services per-
formed under contract." The district court issued orders of
attachment against the defendant's property, and property of
certain Iranian banks was attached to secure any judgment
that might be entered against them. 6 As a result of the Exec-
utive Orders of President Carter, and the subsequent Execu-
tive Order of President Reagan, the district court ordered that
all attachments against the defendant be vacated."
The petitioner then filed an action in a California District
Court claiming that the President, in his executive order, ex-
ceeded his constitutional powers by terminating all legal pro-
ceedings involving Iran. The petitioner further argued that the
President's actions were unconstitutional to the extent they
adversely affected petitioner's final judgment, the execution of
that judgment, and its prejudgment attachments.38 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, but entered an injunction
pending appeal prohibiting the United States from requiring
the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to any writ of
attachment issued by any court in petitioner's favor. 9 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari before judgment could be
reached by the Ninth Circuit."
Justice Rehnquist held that the President's actions sus-
pending claims against Iran was authorized where such "set-
tlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary inci-
dent to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between
34. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
35. Id. at 663-64.
36. Id. at 664.
37. Id. at 666.
38. Id. at 666-67.
39. Id. at 667.
40. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 452 U.S. 932 (1981).
448 [Vol. XX:2
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our country and another.... ."" Since the creation of the Iran
Claims Tribunal stemmed from a major foreign policy dispute
between the United States and Iran, it was legal.42 All dis-
putes between United States nationals and Iranian nationals
would now be heard at the newly formed United States-Iran
Claims Tribunal.
.Although awards of the Tribunal were held to be final and
binding, the Algiers Accords did not provide any enforcement
mechanism. In Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States,43 the
Tribunal considered whether the Accords obligated the United
States to satisfy awards issued in favor of Iran or its nationals
upon the default of American nationals. The Tribunal ruled
that although the United States had no such enforcement
obligation under the Accords themselves, it nevertheless had
assumed a "treaty obligation"44 to provide an enforcement
mechanism for the Tribunal's awards in its domestic courts:
It is therefore incumbent on each State Party to provide some
procedure or mechanism whereby enforcement may be ob-
tained within its national jurisdiction, and to ensure that the
Party has access thereto. If procedures did not already exist
as part of the State's legal system they would have to be es-
tablished ....
The United States has established a uniform means of enforce-
ment through the New York Convention.46
41. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
42. Id.
43. 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 324 (1987).
44. Although the United States does not have to satisfy awards issued in
favor of Iran or its nationals upon the default of American nationals, an obligation
to enforce these awards does exist in Article IV of the Claims Settlement Declara-
tion, which states: "Any award which the Tribunal may render against either gov-
ernment shall be enforceable against such government in the courts of any nation
in accordance with its laws." Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10, 20 I.L.M. at 232. Therefore, the Accords do provide that
the awards should be enforced, yet does not provide the means for such enforce-
ment.
45. Islamic Republic of Iran, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 331.
46. New York Convention, supra note 5.
449
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B. The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards and the
New York Convention
The recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards
began at the end of World War I as a result of increased inter-
national commerce." After the war, the International Cham-
ber of Commerce promoted a convention to confirm en-
forceability of the arbitration clause.4" The League of Nations
followed the Chamber's initiative, and the result was the Gene-
va Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923. 9 The Protocol rec-
ognized the validity of arbitration agreements "whether relat-
ing to existing or future differences"" between parties in con-
tracts dealing with commercial matters.5 Furthermore, the
Protocol provided that the courts of the contracting states
should refer the parties to arbitration if presented with a dis-
agreement which the disputants had agreed was arbitrable.
Enforcement of arbitration awards that arose from the arbitra-
tion agreements covered in the 1923 Protocol52 was provided
for in 1927 under the direction of the League of Nations in the
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.53
Although the Geneva Protocol in 1923 and Convention in
1927 enhanced the legitimacy of arbitration, the latter was
nevertheless still wanting.54 One limitation was that in seek-
ing enforcement, the 1927 Convention placed a heavy burden
on the winning party to provide the conditions necessary for
enforcement.55 Second, the Convention required that parties
to an arbitration hearing must be citizens of the contracting
states.56 The only way arbitration awards could be enforced
47. Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70
YALE L.J. 1049, 1054 (1961).
48. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 6.
49. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923, Sept. 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 158.
50. Id. § 1.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26,
1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302.
54. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7.
55. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7; see also Quigley, supra note 47, at
1055.
56. Contracting states refers to those states which had participated in the
450 [Vol. XX:2
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was if both disputants were citizens of contracting states, and
the arbitral award was made in a contracting state. This was
called the diversity of citizenship clause.57 A decision rendered
in a state that was not one of the contracting states could not
be enforced under the Convention of 1927. Additionally, "the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and the arbitral procedure
should have taken place in conformity with the laws governing
the arbitral procedure; this has almost always been the law of
the country where the arbitration took place."" In other
words, any action to seek enforcement of the award was sub-
ject to the laws of the state where the decision was rendered.
International arbitration then could be governed by national
law.
This sensitive situation eventually caused the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to initiate, a new international
convention on the issue of arbitration awards. The ICC pro-
posed a new draft convention in 1953"9 which aimed essential-
ly at an arbitration which would not be governed by national
law.60 But most states found the idea of international com-
mercial arbitration based solely on an international convention
unappealing. 6' As a result, the draft convention of the ICC62
did not enjoy much support, and never proceeded beyond the
draft stage.
Consequently, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) drafted a different convention in 1955.63
Convention and which had signed and ratified the Protocols.
57. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7; see also Quigley, supra note 47, at
1055.
58. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7.
59. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7 (citing INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, ICC BROCHURE NO. 174, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL
AWARDS, REPORT AND PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION (1953), U.N. Doc. EC.21373
(1953).
60. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7.
61. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7.
62. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7.
63. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, (citing U.N. Doc. E/2704 (1955)). The dif-
ference between this convention and the ICC convention could be found in the
titles of the conventions themselves: the ICC draft convention referred to Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards and the ECOSOC's referred to Foreign Arbitral Awards.
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 7-8. The difference in names emphasized the dif-
ferent approaches. The ICC was concerned that arbitration awards would not be
governed by any national law, only international law. Conversely, the ECOSOC
draft recognized that most countries found the idea of truly international arbitra-
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Pursuant to this draft convention, the Conference on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration convened in New York from
May 20 to June 10, 1958. There, the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitra-
tion Awards, commonly called the New York Convention, was
adopted.'
The New York Convention sought to "liberalize procedures
for enforcing foreign arbitral awards."65 Its goals were to "en-
courage recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and unify the standards
by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral
awards are enforced in signatory countries.""6 The Convention
applied to:
arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought, and arising out of differences between
persons, [and to] ... arbitral awards not considered as do-
mestic awards in the State where their recognition and en-
forcement are sought.67
The Convention was open for signature until December 31,
1958, at which time twenty-five states had signed it.68
tion based solely on an international convention unappealing. VAN DEN BERG, su-
pra note 2, at 7. As such, they recognized that arbitration procedures can be gov-
erned by foreign countries' law, and provided that both parties consent to the law
applicable.
64. New York Convention, supra note 5.
65. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Biotronik Mess-und
Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp.
133, 136 (D.N.J. 1976).
66. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
67. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I.
68. The twenty five states were: Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
India, Israel, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics. Paoli Contini, International Commercial Arbitration-The United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 291 n.38 (1959). Iran is not a contracting state.
One would think then that an Iranian party could not seek enforcement of an
arbitration award under the New York Convention. Had the Geneva Protocols still
been applicable, this would have been the case. However, under the New York
Convention, the diversity of citizenship requirement no longer exists. The Conven-
tion provides for enforcement of awards even when rendered in a non-contracting
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The United States did not ratify the New York Convention
until 1970 through its accession in the Foreign Arbitration
Act. 9 Section 202 of the Act provides that "[an arbitration
agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commer-
cial... falls under the Convention."" Furthermore, in section
203, Congress vested federal district courts with original juris-
diction over any action or proceeding "falling under the Con-
vention,"71 as such an action is "deemed to arise under the
laws and treaties of the United States."72
C. Application of the New York Convention
The New York Convention eliminated the perceived limita-
tions of the Geneva Convention of 1927."3 First, whereas the
Geneva Conventions applied only to commercial claims, the
New York Convention applies to non-domestic awards in the
state where their recognition is being sought,74 whether or not
state and even where a party to the proceeding is not subject to the jurisdiction of
a contracting state. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. Additionally, in the
case of Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., the arbitration award was rendered by
the Tribunal which is seated in the Hague, Netherlands. Netherlands is a con-
tracting state. Consequently, even had diversity of citizenship still been a factor,
Iran could have sought enforcement of the award.
69. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
70. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
71. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
72. Id.
73. See Quigley, supra note 47, at 1060-61. The president of the Conference
summarized the advantages:
It was already apparent that the document represented an improvement
on the Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider definition of the
awards to which the Convention applied; it reduced and simplified the
requirements with which the party seeking recognition or enforcement of
an award would have to comply; it placed the burden of proof on the
party against whom recognition or enforcement was invoked; it gave the
parties greater freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the
arbitration procedure; it gave the authority before which the award was
sought to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the en-
forcement to give suitable security.
Quigley, supra note 47, at 1060 (quoting U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/SR.25, at 2 (1958)).
74. An award rendered in the country where enforcement is being sought is
enforceable if the enforcing state does not consider the award as domestic.
Quigley, supra note 47, at 1061. For instance, an award made in France under
foreign law is regarded as a non-domestic award. Consequently, such an award
can be enforced within France. Quigley, supra note 47, at 1061. This means that
the New York Convention does not only apply to awards rendered outside of the
BROOK. J. INTL L.
those awards regard commercial matters.75 Second, it re-
moved the burden of proof from the successful party and
placed it on the party opposing enforcement.76 Once the party
seeking enforcement presents the arbitration agreement and
the award granted,77 the other party has the burden of dem-
onstrating the grounds for refusal to enforce the award. 8 Fi-
nally, it removed the diversity of citizenship requirement.
The limitations of the Geneva Convention, that in order
for the award to be enforced the award must have been made
in a contracting state, and that the parties had to be subject to
the jurisdiction of contracting states, were eliminated. The
New York Convention confers legitimacy upon awards granted
in any state, whether or not a contracting state, and whether
or not the parties are subject to the jurisdiction of different
contracting states.79 Regarding enforcement, if the parties
have agreed to the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the
arbitration procedure, the decision is binding even if it does
not coincide with the arbitration laws of the country where the
arbitration took place." The New York Convention requires
an arbitration agreement in writing in order to enforce any
future award.8 ' Existence of a valid arbitration agreement
implies that the agreement has been voluntarily entered into
by both parties. Once such an agreement exists, the obligation
for recognition and enforcement of the award is found in Arti-
cle III which states: "Each Contracting State shall recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
enforcing country.
75. Quigley, supra note 47, at 1061.
76. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 9.
77. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. IV; see also infra notes 83-84
and accompanying text.
78. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
79. Quigley, supra note 47, at 1061; see also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at
8. Notwithstanding the breadth of its provisions, the Convention does provide that
any nation may "on the basis of reciprocity" declare that it will apply the Conven-
tion to awards made only in the territory of other contracting states, or that it
will apply only to awards rendered in decisions arising out of what would be con-
sidered commercial disputes under the laws of the state making the declaration.
These two provisions, in Article I(3) of the Convention, are commonly referred to
as the "reciprocity" and "commercial" reservations. Quigley, supra note 47, at 1061;
see also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 12.
80. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 8.
81. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II.
[Vol. XX:2454
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relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following
articles .. . 2 In seeking enforcement of the award in a con-
tracting state, the party seeking enforcement must merely
supply the "original agreement referred to in Article II or a
duly certified copy thereof[,]""3 and "[tihe duly authenticated
original award or a duly certified copy thereof.""
D. The Algiers Accord Is a Valid Arbitration Agreement
According to the New York Convention, awards rendered
by the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal would be enforce-
able in other states if the arbitration agreement is valid, and if
there is a copy of the award rendered by the arbitration
body.85 As a consequence of the signing of the Algiers Ac-
cords, 8 claims arising between nationals of the United States
and nationals of Iran are to be submitted to the United States-
Iran Claims Tribunal; thus, the validity of the Accords as an
arbitration agreement is critical.
The issue of the validity of the Accords was presented to
the Ninth Circuit in Iran v. Gould,7 concerning a contract
entered into between the Ministry of War of the Imperial Gov-
ernment of Iran and Hoffman Electric Corporation (HEC),"
whereby the latter agreed to provide and install certain mili-
tary equipment. 9 The Iranian hostage crisis brought progress
under the contract to an end, however, and HEC filed an ac-
tion against Iran in the District Court for the Central District
of California for breach of contract. HEC received a writ of
attachment on Iranian assets to satisfy its claim."0 However,
after President Reagan ratified the executive orders of Presi-
dent Carter, and further declared all existing claims within the
United States to be terminated, the district court vacated the
judgment.91 HEC then filed a claim with the Tribunal which
82. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. III.
83. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. IV.
84. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. IV.
85. See supra notes 82-83.
86. Algiers Accords, supra note 9.
87. 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
88. In the course of the litigation, Hoffman Electric Corporation merged with
Gould Marketing, Inc. Id. at 1360.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864, 884 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
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ultimately found that HEC owed money to Iran. 2 Iran then
sought confirmation and enforcement of this award in the
Ninth Circuit.
HEC argued that the award was not enforceable because
the Algiers Accord did not constitute a valid arbitration agree-
ment; consequently, the terms of the New York Convention
were not met. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stat-
ing "We construe the Accords themselves as representing the
written agreement so required, on the strength of the
President's authority to settle claims on behalf of United
States nationals through international agreements."" The
court affirmed the president's power to enter into such an
agreement on behalf of United States nationals.94 Iran v.
Gould established the validity of the Algiers Accords as an
arbitration agreement. Consequently, awards rendered by the
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal are enforceable in the
United States under the Federal Arbitration Act through
which the United States acceded to the New York Convention.
E. The Due Process Defense
The New York Convention provides defenses which may be
raised by the party against whom enforcement is being
sought.95 Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention states
92. Iran v. Gould, 887 F.2d 1357, 1359 (9th Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 1363.
94. Id.
95. Article V of the New York Convention provides for two kinds of defenses:
those raised by the party opposing enforcement, New York Convention, supra note
5, art. V(1), and those which may be raised by the court itself, New York Conven-
tion, supra note 5, art. V(2). There are five types of defenses in article V(1):
(a) The parties to the agreement ... were under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceed-
ings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration . .. ; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been
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that enforcement may be challenged if "[tihe party against
whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case."" This clause
incorporates the basic due process defense into the Conven-
tion.97 "The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity [for the party] to be heard 'at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."'9'
Article V(1)(b) provides that a defense to enforcement
exists when "[t]he party against whom the award is invoked
was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitra-
tor or of the arbitration proceedings .. . ."" The requirement
that notice be proper is satisfied when the notice of appoint-
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, the award was made.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1).
Article V(2) is also of two types: the "public policy" defense, which states
that enforcement of the award would be against the public policy of the state, and
the "subject matter" defense, where the subject matter of the defense is not capa-
ble of settlement by arbitration under the laws in the state. Whether the dispute
is arbitrable is to be determined according to the laws of the enforcing state. VAN
DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 369.
96. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(b). Since the Second Circuit
denied enforcement of the arbitration award because of the Tribunars violation of
Avco's due process rights under the New York Convention, this Comment will only
analyze Article V(1)(b).
97. McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 266; see also Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA),
508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974); Quigley, supra note 47, at 1067; VAN DEN BERG,
supra note 2, at 297.
98. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Due process safeguards
are implicit in the public policy defense. New York Convention art. V(2)(b). In
addition:
if due process were only covered by Article V(1)(b), a court would not be
allowed to refuse enforcement of the award on its own motion if it finds
that an award is tainted by a serious violation of due process; it could
refuse enforcement only if the respondent asserts it.
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 299. Article V(1) contains defenses that may only
be raised by the party opposing enforcement. Consequently, the due process de-
fense in Article V(1)(b) could only be brought up at the insistence of the respon-
dent. The court has no grounds to raise a due process defense on its own under
article V(1)(2). However, Article V(2)(b) addresses this situation. Article V(2) con-
tains defenses that can be brought up at the court's insistence. Article V(2)(b), the
public policy defense, has been held to imply a due process defense. Consequently,
even should the respondent not bring due process up on his own, the court may
do so. Therefore, a violation of due process may fall either under Article V(1)(b) or
Article V(2)(b). VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 300.
99. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(b).
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ment of the arbitrator and the arbitral proceedings is ade-
quate. Frequently, however, when notice can be considered
adequate is merely a question of fact.00 Moreover, proper no-
tice requires that the names of the arbitrators be provided to
the parties of the action;'' and that it be timely. "Proper" is
also invoked in a situation where the respondent, being under
a legal incapacity, was not properly represented in the arbitral
proceedings.0 2
The additional defense of "or was otherwise unable to
present his case"' 3 refers to situations where, although no-
tice has been timely given, the party may have been unable to
present himself before the court for causes of force ma-
jeure,' ° or where the party may not have had sufficient op-
portunity to present his case before the arbitrator.0 5
The due process defense has rarely been successful.'
"Despite the broad wording of Article V(1)(b), the courts appear
to accept a violation of due process in very serious cases only,
thereby applying the general rule of interpretation of Article V
that the grounds for refusal of enforcement are to be construed
narrowly."' 7 If after being notified of the hearing, the defen-
dant refuses to appear or remains inactive at the hearing, the
defendant has forfeited his opportunity and cannot later raise
the due process defense.' 8 Two cases illustrate this point. In
100. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 303.
101. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 305.
102. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 305; see also Quigley, supra note 47, at
1067.
103. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(b).
104. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 306; see also Quigley, supra note 47, at
1067. Causes of force majeure are grounds which prevent the completion of an act
because of causes outside the control of the parties that could not have been
avoided by the exercise of due care. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 645 (6th ed. 1990).
105. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 306; see also Quigley, supra note 47, at
1067.
106. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 297; see Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1974) (due process defense was denied where appellants witness was not able to
testify at the hearing); see also Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Sys., Inc., 697 F.
Supp. 1248 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (due process defense was denied where appellant did
not attend arbitration despite having had notice as to its commencement);
Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976) (due process defense was denied where appel-
lant contended that it was "unable to present its case" because its rights and
liabilities had not matured and could not be calculated).
107. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 297.
108. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 306; see also Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F.
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Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford
Medical Instrument Company,10 9 the American respondent
had received notice of the arbitration to take place in Switzer-
land, but did not appear at the arbitration. Medford contended
that it did not appear before the arbitration because it was
"unable to present its case" within the meaning of Article
V(1)(b). Under one of the agreements that existed between the
parties, Medford contended its "rights and liabilities did not
mature, and could not be calculated. ""' until the agreement
had expired. The district court, in narrowly construing the due
process defense, held that:
The primary elements of due process are notice of the pro-
ceedings and the opportunity to be heard... Medford's due
process rights under American Law were not infringed under
the facts of this case. It [Medford] received notice of the pro-
ceedings; it offers no explanation of its failure to partici-
pate."'
Medford could have made its argument before the arbitration
panel; however, because it elected not to appear after receiving
due notice, it cannot invoke the due process defense.
In Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Sys. Inc.,"' Geotech, a
Swiss company, and Evergreen entered into a partnership
agreement. The agreement provided for arbitration. As a result
of a dispute, an arbitration proceeding was commenced by
Geotech in Switzerland. Evergreen did not participate despite
notice that arbitration would proceed without him. When the
arbitrator found for Geotech, Evergreen sought to bar enforce-
ment alleging that its rights of due process had been violated
because they did not have the opportunity to present their
case, and that enforcement should be denied according to Arti-
cle V(1)(b) of the New York Convention. The court held there
was no violation of due process because Evergreen received
notice of the proceedings, yet refused to appear. "Evergreen's
failure to participate was a decision that was reached only
after the Company had full knowledge of the peril at which it
Supp. at 1248.
109. 415 F. Supp. at 133.
110. Id. at 140.
111. Id.
112. 697 F. Supp. at 1248.
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acted. Accordingly... recognition and enforcement of the
award will not violate... Article V."113
Another case where the due process exception was con-
strued narrowly was Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v.
SocigtM Gen~rale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA)," 4 heard
before the Second Circuit. Parsons appealed a decision of the
district court confirming a foreign arbitration award holding
them liable to the Egyptian corporation RAKTA for breach of
contract. In November 1962, Parsons entered into an agree-
ment with RAKTA to construct, start up, and for one year,
manage and supervise a paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt.
The contract contained an arbitration clause to provide a
means for settlement of differences arising in the course of
performance. The contract also contained a force majeure
clause"' which excused delays due to causes beyond Parsons'
ability to control.
In May 1967, with Arab-Israeli war imminent, amidst
escalating public expressions of hostility against Americans,
the majority of the American work staff left Egypt. The Egyp-
tian government eventually broke off all ties with the United
States, and ordered all Americans to leave Egypt. Parsons
notified RAKTA that they considered their abandonment ex-
cused by the force majeure clause; RAKTA disagreed and
sought damages for breach of contract. The claim was submit-
ted to arbitration and a final award was rendered for RAKTA.
Parsons presented five defenses to the district court to pre-
clude enforcement. 1 6 One of the defenses was that Parsons
was unable to present its case because the arbitrator had re-
fused to delay the arbitral proceedings to accommodate the
schedule of a Parsons's witness who could not attend at the
time requested. The district court denied the defenses raised
by Parsons. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
113. Id. at 1253.
114. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
115. For a definition of force majeure see supra note 104.
116. The five defenses presented were: (1) enforcement of the award would
violate the public policy of the United States; (2) the award represents an arbitra-
tion of matters not appropriately decided by arbitration; (3) the Tribunal denied
Overseas an adequate opportunity to present their case; (4) the award is predicat-
ed upon a resolution of issues outside the scope of contractual agreement to sub-
mit to arbitration; and (5) the award is in manifest disregard of the law. 508 F.2d
at 972-73.
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firmed the district court's ruling, stating that an "inability to
produce one's witnesses before an arbitral tribunal is a risk
inherent in an... agreement to submit to arbitration." 7
Consequently, "[Parsons'] due process rights under American
law, rights entitled to full force under the Convention as a
defense to enforcement, were in no way infringed by the
tribunal's decision."1
In a case decided by the court of appeals of Hamburg, the
German respondent alleged he did not have the opportunity to
present his case because certain documents of the English
claimant did not reach him until the night before the oral
hearing in London and he had no time to read them. The court
rejected this argument, holding that due process was not vio-
lated. The court further opined that the respondent had will-
fully not taken notice of the document by not reading it."9
These cases illustrate the narrow construction of the due
process defense rendered by the courts. Such an interpretation
is consistent with the overall purpose of the Convention which
is to simplify the enforcement process. As the district court in
Biotronik noted, "[iut goes without saying that there should be
great hesitation in upsetting an arbitration award."'2 °
III. FACTS OF IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES V. AVCO
CORPORATION
In 1976, Avco Corporation entered into a series of con-
tracts whereby it agreed to repair and supply helicopter en-
gines to Iran Aircraft Industries. After the revolution in 1978-
79, disputes arose concerning Avco's performance under the
contracts and Iranian Aircraft Industries' payments under the
contracts. The parties met in Paris in 1980 where Iran Aircraft
agreed that approximately eleven million dollars was due to
Avco for work performed, but denied an additional claim by
Avco for approximately one million dollars. Iran Aircraft In-
117. Id. at 975.
118. Id. at 976.
119. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 307 (citing Judgment of July 27, 1978,
Oberlandesgericht [OLGI of Hamburg, No. 18 (F.R.G.)). Although decisions ren-
dered in a foreign country are not binding in United States courts, they can serve
as persuasive authority.
120. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical
Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J. 1976)
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dustries refused to confirm the invoices representing the one
million dollars. 2' Iran Aircraft did not pay either the agreed
upon eleven million, or the disputed one million to Avco corpo-
ration. Consequently, on January 14, 1982, the dispute con-
cerning the money owed was submitted to the Tribunal for
binding arbitration. Iran Aircraft counterclaimed against Avco
asserting that Avco owed them money for damage due to delay
in the return of certain aircraft parts, and for breach of con-
tract.
122
On May 17, 1985, the Tribunal held a pre-hearing confer-
ence to consider, among other things, "whether voluminous and
complicated data [the many invoices] should be presented
through summaries, tabulations, charts, graphs or extracts in
order to save time and costs.' 23 Present at the pre-hearing
conference was the chairman of the Tribunal, Judge Nils
Mangard of Sweden, as well as Judge Charles Brower and
representatives for Avco. Counsel for Avco stated that "[iun the
interest of keeping down some of the documentation for the
Tribunal, we have not placed in evidence as of yet the actual
supporting invoices. But we have those invoices and they are
available.. ...,,12' The chairman of the Tribunal, Judge
Mangard, stated "I don't think we will be very, very much
enthusiastic getting kilos and kilos of invoices" and suggested
that Avco "[glet an account made."25 In response to this sug-
gestion, Avco's counsel retained Arthur Young & Co., an inter-
nationally recognized public accounting firm, to prepare the
invoice summary.'26
The Tribunal held its hearings on the merits of the case on
September 16-17, 1986. Judge Mangard, by then, was replaced
by Judge Virally of France. Only the American judge, Judge
Brower, was on the panel at the prehearing conference. Judge
Ansari, the Iranian arbitrator, questioned the absence of the
invoices stating that this case "was one of the first, or one of
the few cases that I have seen that the invoices have not been
submitted."27 Avco's counsel responded by recounting the
121. Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Indus., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200 (1988).
122. Id. at 216.
123. Id. at 235.
124. Id. at 235-36.
125. Id. at 236.
126. Id. at 236.
127. Transcript of Trial Hearing before the Tribunal at 107-08, Avco Corp. v.
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events of the pre-hearing conference and reiterated Judge
Mangard's statement to them. Judge Ansari was not satisfied
by this reply and did not respond affirmatively.
On July 18, 1988, the Tribunal found that as per the Paris
agreement, Iran Aircraft owed Avco eleven million dollars.
However, the Tribunal disallowed Avco's claims for the disput-
ed million dollars which were documented by the audited sum-
maries of the invoices. The Tribunal stated that they "cannot
grant Avco's claim solely on the basis of an affidavit and a list
of invoices, even if the existence of the invoices was certified by
an independent audit."2 ' The Tribunal found for Iran Air-
craft Industries on some of their counterclaims, and after off-
setting the amount Iran Aircraft owed to Avco, and the amount
Avco owed to Iran Aircraft, a net amount of $1,383,263.21 was
owed to Iran Aircraft Industries.'29 Judge Brower concurred
in part,3 ° and dissented in part, 3' on the grounds that
since Avco did what it was told at the pre-hearing conference,
by refusing to accept the sufficiency of the summaries the
Tribunal was not permitting Avco to present its case.
The Iranian parties sought enforcement of their one mil-
lion dollar award in the United States under the New York
Convention. On December 10, 1991, the District Court for the
District of Connecticut refused enforcement of the award and
granted defendant Avco a motion for summary judgment.'32
On appeal, Iran argued that the Tribunal's award was directly
enforceable in the United States under the Algerian Accords,
and alternatively, that the award was enforceable under the
New York Convention. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit disagreed, and affirmed the district court's decision
that Avco's due process rights had been violated,'33 and that
Iran Aircraft Indus., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200 (1988) (No. 261).
128. Avco Corp., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 214.
129. Id. at 218.
130. Judge Brower concurred with the majority decision regarding the dismissal
of an additional claim that was set forth by Avco on the basis of lack of jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 239 (Brower, J., concurring and dissenting).
131. Judge Brower dissented on the finding for Iran Aircraft regarding the
monetary claim asserted by Avco, believing that Avco was misled regarding the
evidence it was required to submit regarding the invoices. Id. at 231 (Brower, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
132. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., No. 5:91 Civ. 286 (D. Conn. Dec. 10,
1991).
133. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992).
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in conformity with Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention,
the award was not enforceable.
134
The Second Circuit reasoned that a violation of due pro-
cess had occurred when the Tribunal held that the summary
invoices submitted by Avco were not sufficient.135 Avco had
been following Judge Mangard's "suggestion."136 Avco had
been misled into thinking that the summaries were adequate
and was therefore denied the opportunity to present its claim
meaningfully.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Cardamone asserted that
the exchange during the prehearing conference was not a bind-
ing rule, and did not preclude the submission of the actual
invoices. 13' Additionally, the dissent argued that Judge
Ansari's questioning, and dissatisfaction with Avco's reply, had
put Avco on notice of the possibility that the panel would
choose not to rely on the invoice summaries alone.1
8
IV. ANALYSIS:
A. A Due Process Violation is Incompatible with the
Circumstances Surrounding Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco
Corporation
Avco claims a violation of its due process rights, maintain-
ing that the award rendered in favor of Iran Aircraft Indus-
tries by the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal should not be
enforced. Avco steadfastly asserts that Judge Mangard's re-
marks at the pre-hearing conference constituted a binding
ruling, and consequently they cannot be held liable for having
failed to produce the actual invoices in question. As has al-
ready been stated, due process essentially guarantees the "op-
portunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaning-
ful manner.' 139 However, being unable to present all of one's
evidence is not the same as being denied the opportunity to be
meaningfully heard and is not synonymous with being unable
to present his case.
134. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(b).
135. Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 146.
136. Judge Mangard's remarks are characterized as a "suggestion" by the Sec-
ond Circuit itself in its opinion in Iran Aircraft Indus. . Id. at 144.
137. Id. at 148 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 147 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
139. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
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As seen above, in Parsons & Whittemore, the respondent
was unable to assert a due process defense where its witness
was unable to be produced." The respondent's inability to
present evidence was not held to constitute a violation of due
process.' When a party may be expected to anticipate a
problem but fails to do so it is no more a denial of due process
than when a party receives notice of a proceeding but fails to
attend. The former scenario existed in a case where the re-
spondent alleged a due process violation when he did not have
the opportunity to read documents sent to him by his opposing
counsel.' The latter situation existed where the respondent
had received notice of the arbitration proceeding yet failed to
respond.' In neither instance is the party being denied the
opportunity to present its case; it has simply not availed itself
of the opportunity presented. That was the case in Iran Air-
craft Industries v. Avco Corporation.' Avco asserted that be-
cause it was following Judge Mangard's recommendation in
retaining Arthur Young & Co. and receiving a summary of the
invoices, " 5 when the Tribunal rejected the summaries, it was
"unable to present its case." In the appellate brief submitted by
Avco's counsel before the Second Circuit, Avco contended that
Judge Mangard's remarks were not a suggestion but constitut-
ed a "decision,"" a "binding ruling,"47 and that the Judge
"directed""' Avco's counsel not to produce any invoices. The
brief further asserted that "Avco, having offered to put the
invoice documents into evidence, was instructed by the Tribu-
nal not to do that,"' and furthermore, that "it was affirma-
tively told by the Tribunal that this evidence would be accept-
able and, indeed, was the Tribunal's preferred form of evi-
dence."150 Therefore, claims Avco, its due process rights were
violated through no fault or action of their own when those
140. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
144. 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
146. Brief for Appellee at 2, Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141
(2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-7217).
147. Id. at 20.
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 33.
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very same summaries were rejected by the Tribunal.
These assertions are quite different than Avco's position
years earlier at the Tribunal itself. "[T]he plain and common
sense import of [Judge] Mangard's guarded words was not lost
on Avco's trial counsel in the Tribunal in 1985. He well under-
stood that Chairman Mangard had not 'instructed' or 'directed'
him to retain an independent accountant to review Avco's
accounts receivable ledger. ... ,,"' Two months after the con-
ference, on July 22, 1985, Avco's counsel filed a supplemental
Memorial with the Tribunal stating: "In response to the
Tribunal's suggestion at the Prehearing Conference, Avco's
counsel has retained Avco's independent auditor, Arthur Young
& Co..... ,,152 As a "suggestion" Judge Mangard's remarks
do not carry the weight of an order. A suggestion is merely a
recommendation, which may, or may not, be followed. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized this as well,
when they said in their opinion, "in response to the Tribunal's
suggestion... counsel has retained Arthur Young &
Co .... ""' By all accounts, therefore, Mangard's statement
does not appear to have been an order or a directive, but mere-
ly a suggestion.
Mangard himself, moreover, was hesitant in suggesting
this course of action. He said, "[o]n the other hand, I don't
know if... there are any objections to any specific invoices so
far made by the Respondents. But anyhow as a precaution
maybe you could... [g]iet an account made....""' Judge
Mangard never summarily declared that summaries of the
invoices would be sufficient, and did in fact characterize hav-
ing an account made as only a precaution. This is hardly a
"ruling" that could be expected to carry great weight. A "pre-
caution" can also be defined as "in addition." That is, in addi-
tion to the invoices, bring a summary, in case we decide to only
look at the summaries.
According to Bruno Ristau, counsel for Iran Aircraft Indus-
tries, Iran vigorously objected to Judge Mangard's sugges-
151. Reply Brief for Appellants at 7, Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980
F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-7217).
152. Brief for Appellee at 3 (emphasis added).
153. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 1992) (em-
phasis added).
154. Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added).
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tion.'55 Brice M. Clagett, counsel for Avco Corporation, ac-
knowledged that the Iranian parties had objected to Mangard's
suggestion, and that Avco knew of this opposition prior to the
hearing.'56 Clagett explained that Avco did nothing in re-
sponse to Iran Aircrafts expressed opposition probably because
Avco was relying on Judge Mangard's "ruling." Avco asserts
that, had the "ruling" changed, they should have been notified
by the panel. However, since Judge Mangard's recommenda-
tion was clearly to have the accounts made more as a "precau-
tion,"51 and not a "ruling," there was no need for the Tribu-
nal to supply notice.
Furthermore, the facts of the case are such that there was
an amount of approximately one million dollars, represented in
actual invoices, that would not be confirmed by Iran Aircraft
Industries."' If there was opposition regarding the presenta-
tion of the actual invoices, it is logical to assume there would
be opposition regarding something less then the original invoic-
es. Certainly, Avco should have been wary.
Arguendo, even if Judge Mangard's statement was author-
itative, Iran's objections should nevertheless have suggested to
Avco that complications may ensue should it attempt to pres-
ent its case based on summaries alone. There was always the
risk that the Tribunal would pay heed to Iran Aircrafts objec-
tions. What the Second Circuit has done here is sanction indif-
ference and inaction on the part of a party who was made
aware of potential weaknesses in its case. Rather than hold
the party responsible for its failure to take all precautions to
ameliorate the potential request for invoices, the court has
rewarded the party for its inaction.
The time frame of the arbitration is relevant, too.'59 Al-
most one and a half years elapsed between the pretrial hearing
and the actual hearing. Within such a span of time it is not
surprising for changes to occur that affect the pretrial "ruling."
In fact, a major change did occur: a new judge was appointed.
155. Telephone Interview with Bruno A. Ristau, Attorney, Ristau & Abbell (Oct.
12, 1993).
156. Telephone Interview with Brice M. Clagett, Attorney, Covington & Burling
(Oct. 26, 1993).
157. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
158. See supra iote 121 and accompanying text.
159. The pretrial hearing took place on May 17, 1985. Brief for Appellee at 1.
The actual hearing took place on Sept. 16-17, 1986. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5.
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Judge Mangard left the panel. In his place, Judge Virally of
France joined the panel. As such, the judge upon whose tenta-
tive recommendation Avco presented its evidence would not
preside at the actual hearing. This should have made Avco all
the more cautious; instead, Avco proceeded as if nothing had
changed. Avco did not claim that it did not receive notice of the
assignment of a new arbitrator. If that was the case, they
could justifiably have argued denial of due process. Avco's lack
of such a claim is persuasive authority that it was aware of the
change in the Tribunal's arbitrators. They therefore should
have anticipated the possible problems as a result of the reas-
sembling of the panel.
Avco's inaction is especially questionable in light of the
structure of the arbitration panel. The panel was a panel of
three: one arbitrator chosen by Iran, one chosen by the United
States, and one selected by the two other arbitrators. An attor-
ney has noted that in a three panel proceeding, the Iranian
judge is likely to side with the Iranian nationals, the United
States arbitrator with the party from the United States, and
the neutral third arbitrator would be the swing vote. 6 ' Judge
Mangard was the swing vote. With the departure of the judge
who'suggested the format of the evidence, and in light of Iran's
expressed opposition to the sufficiency of Arthur Young &
Company's summaries, there was a good possibility that the
new judge would also hold that the summaries alone were
insufficient. That is in fact what happened. Judge Ansari and
the new judge, Judge Virally, voted against the sufficiency of
the summaries alone.'6 ' Without Judge Mangard, Avco could
not have been sure that the new "neutral" judge would concur
that summaries alone were sufficient; Avco therefore should
have taken the precaution to be prepared to show all the in-
voices.
The hearing lasted two days.'62 At the hearing, the fol-
lowing exchange took place between counsel for Avco and
Judge Ansari: Judge Ansari commented, "May I ask a ques-
160. The attorney who has made this allegation has requested anonymity. A
second attorney, however, who also requested anonymity, disagreed with his
colleague's assessment, and felt that, for the most part, the arbitrators approach
each case without bias.
161. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
162. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1992).
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tion? It is about the evidence. It was one of the first or one of
the few cases that I have seen that the invoices have not been
submitted."163 Once Ansari questioned the absence of the in-
voices, Avco had effectively been put on notice that the panel
was not receptive to the submission of summaries alone. No
one on the panel declared during the hearing that the summa-
ries were sufficient. It is arguably true that Avco would find it
difficult to produce all the invoices overnight. But since there
clearly were disparate viewpoints regarding sufficiency of the
evidence, and that these documents were crucial to Avco's
claims, Avco should have had the invoices available in case
they were needed.
After the Tribunal's decision, Avco still had a further re-
course. A party to an arbitration action may make a motion
subsequent to the hearing for an additional reward."M Avco
filed no motion for reconsideration, no petition addressed to
the full tribunal, and no letter of complaint addressed to the
president of the Tribunal.'65 Presumably, Avco did not do so
because they believed that the rules of the Tribunal did not
allow any post partial award petition or motion for reconsider-
ation of new evidence. 6 However, Article 37 of the Tribunal
Rules does permit such reconsideration. 67 Nevertheless, Avco
made no attempt to supplement the summaries presented at
the hearing with the actual invoices. Being "unable to present
163. Id.
164. Reply Brief for Appellants at 12-13 nn.8, 9.
165. Reply Brief for Appellants at 12.
166. Brief for Appellee at 20 n.9.
167. Article 37 of the Tribunal Rules states the following:
(1) Within thirty days after the receipt of the award, either party, with
notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to make an
additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but
omitted from the award.
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request for an additional award
to be justified and considers that the omission can be rectified without
any further hearings or evidence, it shall complete its award within sixty
days after the receipt of the request.
2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 405, 437 (1984).
Parties to a hearing may make a motion for an additional award. The
Iranian parties made such a request in the present case, requesting the Tribunal
"to correct the award and render a complimentary award". Reply Brief for the
Apellants, at 13 n.9. The Chamber denied the motion, not for a lack of authority
but on the merits, "on the ground that the award had 'specifically addressed the
issue of payment for and delivery of the goods in question.'" Id. Consequently,
there is future review of the same merits upon application. Id.
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one's case" as a due process defense means being unable only
after all possible avenues have been explored. That effort was
not evidenced here; therefore, the claim that Avco was "unable
to present their case," is without merit.
In alleging a violation of due process, the burden of proof
is on the party opposing enforcement.'68 In a civil action, this
proof must be by a "preponderance of the evidence," demon-
strating that the existence of a contested fact is more probable
than its nonexistence.'69 Avco has not been able to show that
Judge Mangard's remarks were, more probably than not,
meant as a binding rule. That this standard was met here by
Avco is an incredible assertion; at best, the evidence presented
by both sides is equal. In close cases, where neither side has
clearly and convincingly proved its case, the party asserting
the claim must fail for having declined to meet its burden.
It seems clear that Judge Mangard's remarks were not
meant as a "ruling" but merely to serve as a "precaution."
Additionally, it seems evident that Avco had considerable no-
tice that summaries alone might not be sufficient at the hear-
ing. Despite this, Avco decided to take the risk by not acting to
take all necessary precautions. A violation of due process does
not exist where there has been considerable advance notice but
the party receiving notice does nothing.7 ' The conclusion of
the Second Circuit flouts the theory of due process, and is
inconsistent with other decisions dealing with the same issue.
In reality, if Avco was unable to present its case, it was due to
an unprofessional lack of preparedness for all the develop-
ments likely to emerge in the course of arbitration.
B. Finding a Due Process Violation is Inconsistent with
Previous Cases
The Due Process exception has been narrowly con-
strued.'' In most cases where this defense has been raised,
the defense has not been granted. Several cases illustrate the
narrow application of the due process exception.
In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socigtg Genarale
168. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V; see also text accompanying
note 76.
169. EDWARD CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 957 (3d ed. 1984).
170. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
171. See supra part II.E; see also McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 266.
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de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),7 2 Parsons, an American
company, was held liable to the Egyptian company RAKTA in
an arbitration proceeding. Parsons's inability to produce a
witness did not result in a violation of due process. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "inability to pro-
duce one's witnesses before an arbitral tribunal is a risk inher-
ent in an agreement to submit to arbitration. By agreeing to
submit disputes to arbitration, a party relinquishes his court-
room rights ... in favor of arbitration 'with all of its well
known advantages and drawbacks.""73 Consequently, the
court held there was no violation of due process."
In that decision, the Second Circuit incisively notes there
are inherent risks and disadvantages to arbitration. In Parsons
& Whittemore, the American party took those risks and failed.
In Avco, the American party similarly took risks and failed as
well. In both cases, the American parties were not fully pre-
pared. Avco's risk was whether the Tribunal would accept or
reject the summaries of the invoices. There is an important
distinction, however, between the risk undertaken by Parsons
and the risk assumed by Avco. The risk in Parsons &
Whittemore involved the appearance of a witness. Circumstanc-
es beyond anyone's control may make it impossible for a wit-
ness to attend a hearing. On the other hand, the risk assumed
by Avco was entirely of its own making, and under its control.
Avco had notice of the fact that presenting the summaries
alone may be opposed.'75 Avco could have nullified this risk,
but chose not to. However, oddly enough, the Second Circuit
allowed Avco's defense to stand. Based on the Second Circuit's
decision in Parsons and Whittemore, narrowly constricting the
due process defense, one would have expected that Avco's due
process defense would similarly fail.
Geotech Lizens AG v. Evergreen Sys., Inc.76 involved the
nonappearance of one party at the arbitration hearing, despite
having received notice. The nonappearing party sought to deny
172. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 114-18 and accompany-
ing text.
173. 508 F.2d at 975.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 144-70 and accompanying text.
176. 697 F. Supp 1248 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also supra notes 112-13 and accom-
panying text.
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enforcement, alleging a violation of due process. The District
Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the allega-
tion of a violation of due process, stating, "Evergreen's failure
to participate was a decision that was reached only after the
Company had full knowledge of the peril at which it acted.
Accordingly, the Court holds that recognition and enforcement
of the award will not violate the notice provisions of section
(1)(b) of Article V."
1 77
Although the aspect of due process violation alleged in
Geotech Lizens AG concerned the "notice" element of due pro-
cess, not the "unable to present one's case" aspect, the reason-
ing behind the court's decision applies to all due process de-
fenses in Article (V)(1)(b). The court's reasoning was that since
Evergreen knew of the peril it assumed as a result of its
(non)action, Evergreen cannot allege a due process defense.
Comparison to the Avco case is clear. Avco also voluntarily
assumed the risk and should also have recognized the peril of
not presenting the actual invoices. But the Second Circuit
refused to follow this logic and is therefore inconsistent with
the Geotech Lizens AG decision.
Finally, in 1978, the court of appeals of Hamburg1 ' de-
nied the respondent the defense of violation of due process,
despite the fact that the respondent had first received docu-
ments from his opponent the night before the trial and did not
have the opportunity to read them. The court held that the
"counterpart of due process is an active participation in the
arbitral proceedings; by not unpacking the documents, the
respondent had willfully not taken notice of them."179 Al-
though decisions of foreign courts do not have binding authori-
ty in United States courts, they can serve as persuasive au-
thority. As the American court did in Parsons &
Whittemore,' the German court held that each party to a
dispute will be held accountable to prepare as fully as possible.
Avco, in its dispute with Iran Aircraft Industries, had a full
177. 697 F. Supp. at 1253.
178. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 307 (citing Judgment of July 27, 1978,
OLG of Hamburg, No. 18 (F.R.G.)); see also supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
179. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 307 (citing Judgment of July 27, 1978,
OLG of Hamburg, No. 18 (F.R.G.)).
180. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RATKA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
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year and a half between the time of the prehearing conference
and the hearing to duly prepare and assemble all the evidence.
It did not do so. In short, Avco was voluntarily unprepared for
all circumstances. Once again, there is a inconsistency in the
reasoning between the two decisions. In the German case,
where it can be strongly argued that the respondent was not
permitted sufficient time to prepare, and was therefore unable
to present his case, the court nevertheless held there was no
violation of due process. In the Avco case, where there was
ample time to prepare, the Second Circuit held there was a
violation of due process.
The three cases cited show that arbitration awards will be
enforced and that the due process defense is narrowly con-
strued and not easily granted. The decision rendered by the
Second Circuit in Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp. 8' is in-
consistent with other decisions dealing with the Article V(1)(b)
defense.
C. A Due Process Violation Does Not Exist Where the Result of
the Case Would have been the Same Absent Any Violation
There is another consideration here: Should a violation of
due process result in the denial of enforcement of award where
the result of the arbitration would have been the same even if
no violation had existed? This question was addressed by the
Court of Appeals in Hamburg in a case where the arbitrator
had not forwarded a claimant's letter to a respondent, who
consequently was unable to respond to it. 8 ' The Court held
that the question to be asked was whether, had the violation
not occurred, the result of the arbitration would have been
different. "This would mean that if it were beyond doubt that
the arbitral decision would have been the same, a serious vio-
lation might not lead to a refusal of enforcement of the
award."1" Apparently, if it is clear that the arbitral decision
would not have been different had there not been a violation of
due process, it would make no sense to refuse enforcement."
181. 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
182. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 301 (citing Judgment of Apr. 3, 1975,
OLG of Hamburg, No. 11 (F.R.G.)).
183. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 301-02 (quoting Judgment of Apr. 3,
1975, OLG of Hamburg, No. 11 (F.R.G.)).
184. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 302.
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A lack of due process, under certain circumstances, does not
necessarily preclude enforcement of the award. "A legal justifi-
cation for this point of view can be found in the opening line of
paragraph 1 of Article V: 'Recognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused.""5 As noted above, although decisions
of foreign courts are not binding on United States courts, they
can, and often do, serve as persuasive authority.
In Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp."5 6 it is unclear if the
award would have been different even had the invoices been
present. At the hearing, the panel stated in its opinion:
The Tribunal notes that the independent accountant retained
by the Claimant was instructed only to verify whether there
existed an invoice corresponding to each entry of AVCO's
accounts receivable ledgers submitted by the Claimant and
whether the amounts reflected in the ledgers agreed with the
amounts reflected on the corresponding underlying copies of
invoices. Such a procedure, indeed, provides the Tribunal
with adequate evidence of the existence of the invoices listed
in AVCO's accounts receivable ledgers."'7
The panel added:
AVCO relies primarily on affidavits of its officers and an
independent accountant, and has not produced any purchase
orders, bills of lading, written demand for payment or other
documentary evidence... [Tihe Tribunal cannot grant
AVCO's claim solely on the basis of an affidavit and a list of
invoices, even if the existence of the invoices was certified by
an independent audit."s
Judge Ansari in his separate opinion stated further:
even assuming that the auditor was impartial and indepen-
dent, his report cannot constitute evidence of the veracity of
185. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 302. The use of the word "may" implies
that the court can exercise discretion in deciding whether to enforce the arbitra-
tion award or not. Just because one of the defenses has sufficiently been made
out, does not automatically imply that the court has to deny enforcement. They
"may" or "may not" deny enforcement. This analysis supports the argument that
although a violation of due process may have occurred, the arbitration award does
not have to be vacated.
186. 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
187. Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Indus., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200, 208
(1988).
188. Id. at 214.
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the purport and substance of the invoices in dispute, because
the mere conformity of the invoices at issue in the claim with
the Claimant's ledgers provides nothing more than the very
claim brought by the Claimant."8 9
These statements show that the existence of the invoices was
not in question. The arbitrators believed that the invoices did
exist. However, their mere existence does not authenticate
their claims. Something additional is required to verify the
amounts in the invoices-actual documentary evidence, such as
purchase orders or bills of lading-that would confirm the
truthfulness of what the invoices recorded. The Iranian parties
did not dispute that they owed Avco some money for services
rendered, but they did not assent to the amounts alleged in the
invoices. 90 Arthur Young & Co., the independent auditor, did
not clarify this because all it did was verify that what was in
Avco's Accounts Receivable ledger was what appeared on the
invoices. The auditor did not attest to the appropriateness of
the invoices' numbers.' 9 ' It appears, then, that even the pres-
ence of the actual invoices would not have been sufficient in
the absence of some corroborating evidence confirming the
accuracy of the amounts being claimed. It was not the actual
invoices the Tribunal needed, but rather some proof that what
was in the invoices was accurate.'92 Avco alleged violation of
due process because they were misled about the necessity of
presenting the invoices. Accordingly, even had Avco been able
to present the invoices before the panel, the results of the
hearing may well have been the same. Therefore, even if Avco's
due process rights were violated, if it were beyond question
that the decision rendered by the panel would not have been
different had the invoices been present, then the serious viola-
tion of due process would have had no effect and the decision
could still have been enforced.'
189. Id. at 244 (Introduction of separate opinion of Judge Ansari).
190. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, 35-36.
191. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
193. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 2, at 301-02.
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C. Reasons for the Second Circuit Decision
One may only speculate as to why the court decided the
way it did. In light of the fact that Judge Mangard's remarks
were meant as a precaution and not a "ruling," and because of
the apparent inconsistency between the Iran Aircraft Indus. v.
Avco Corp."" decision and other decisions in cases dealing
with the Article V(1)(b) defense, this Comment asserts that
there may be a higher level of scrutiny applied by the Second
Circuit court to decisions rendered by the United States-Iran
Claims Tribunal. There may be an unvoiced and unconscious
bias stemming from anti-Iranian feelings in general, and
against decisions rendered by the Tribunal in particular. First,
Iran is widely perceived as hostile towards the United States
and, by extension, United States interests. Indeed the United
States has no diplomatic relations with Iran. This perception
may unconsciously bias judicial review of decisions that favor
Iranian parties over the interests of United States parties.
Second, the Tribunal itself was created as a direct conse-
quence of the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis,19 an
incident which caused Americans to harbor great resentment
towards Iran. This resentment was exacerbated by the estab-
lishment of the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal because it
meant that nationals of the United States had no choice but to
present their cases in that forum. 96 A party wanting his case
heard in the United States could not do so. The party was not
free to choose. Americans do not take kindly to curtailment of
their freedoms.'97 This abridgement of freedom of choice, tak-
en together with general resentment of a perceived foe with
whom we have no diplomatic relations in the emotionally
charged atmosphere of hostages, may be what lead the Second
Circuit to apply stricter scrutiny of the due process defense
when reviewing decisions of the Tribunal that favored Iranian
parties over the interests of United States parties. Although
such reasoning is mere speculation since the Ninth Circuit has
enforced a decision rendered by the Tribunal in favor of
Iran,"9 ' nevertheless, such reasoning is possible. Judges in
194. 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
195. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
196. 980 F.2d at 143.
197. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
198. Iran v. Gould, 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
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different circuits may be swayed by different considerations.
It is striking that arbitration awards rendered by panels
established independently by the parties concerned are rou-
tinely "rubberstamped,"'99 while an award arbitrated by a
body established by two nation-states is not readily en-
forced."0 One would expect, in light of the strong bias in fa-
vor of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,2 ' that the
"seal of approval" given to the arbitration panel by the two
nations in dispute would result in the enforcement of its deci-
sions.
It is also possible that the Second Circuit may have been
influenced by an event which compromised the prestige of the
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal. In its brief to the court,
Avco related an incident which occurred prior to Judge
Mangard's resignation from the Tribunal.0 2 In September
1984, at a meeting of the full Tribunal, all proceedings were
suspended after two Iranian arbitrators physically attacked
Judge Mangard and tried to strangle him with his tie.2 °3 One
of the arbitrator-assailants subsequently declared, "[i]f
Mangard ever dares to enter the tribunal chamber again, ei-
ther his corpse or my corpse will leave it rolling down the
stairs."0 4 Not surprisingly, in January of 1985, Mangard did
resign from the Tribunal.2 5 One may infer that Judge
Mangard's resignation from the Tribunal by the time of the
Avco hearing is related to the 1984 events. Avco asserts that
the change in the composition of the Tribunal contributed to
199. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983); Fotochrome,
Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); International Standard Elec. Corp.
v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Commercial, 745 F. Supp. 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Del. 1990). It should be noted that the Second Circuit has in the past enforced
decisions rendered by other foreign arbitration panels, therefore it is intriguing
that it did not do so in this case.
200. There are few other cases, with Iran or an Iranian national as a party,
involving enforcement of a foreign arbitration award. The cases that exist concern-
ing decisions of the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal do not focus on the en-
forcement issue. See Chas. T. Main Int'l v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651
F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981); Sperry Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 736 (1987).
201. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
202. Brief for Appellee at 39 n.24.
203. Id.; see also Around the World; Iranian Judge Threatens A Swede at The
Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1984, at A5.
204. Brief for Appellee at 39 n.24.
205. Id.
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the fact that Judge Mangard's "ruling" was not honored in the
Tribunal's award."6 By recounting this story, it appears Avco
is attempting to tarnish the validity of the Tribunal as an arbi-
tration body. Indeed, that was how Iran's counsel saw it.
20 7
There is no way to ascertain if these events actually compro-
mised the Tribunal in the eyes of the court. As a result of
Avco's recounting of this incident and Judge Mangard's subse-
quent resignation, the legitimacy of the Tribunal may have
been impugned, thus explaining the court's decision.
The application of a higher level of scrutiny is unfair, of
course, when applied only to one country. It is important to re-
member that the Iranian parties suffer from the same lack of
choice: they, too, may only submit disputes with the United
States to the Tribunal. When seeking enforcement of an award
in the United States, the Iranian party is at the mercy of Unit-
ed States courts. It is the assertion of this Comment that in
cases involving enforcement of foreign arbitration awards,
there should be one standard of review, irrespective of the
panel that established the award. Awards rendered by the
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal should not be subject to a
more stringent review because the parties to the dispute had
no choice but to submit their dispute to that Tribunal, because
of the history of that panel, or for any other reason. Neither
should they be afforded deferential review because the Tribu-
nal is a result of an agreement between two independent na-
tion-states. If the level of scrutiny is to be a strict one, it must
be applied across the board.
IV. CONCLUSION
The New York Convention was an international effort to
make the arbitration process simpler and more efficient. The
Supreme Court said:
The goal of the Convention and the principle purpose under-
lying American adoption and implementation of it was to
encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
206. Id.
207. Reply Brief for Appellants at 18-19. Counsel for Iran Aircraft Industries
states: "It is totally unseemly for a party to defame, in a document filed in a
United States court of law, members of a respected International Tribunal . ...
We respectfully request the Court order that pages 39 and 40 of Avco's brief be
stricken as scandalous . " Id.
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arbitration agreements in international contracts and to
unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory
countries."'
In this respect it has been successful. Arbitration awards
are recognized in most countries, as is the enforcement of
awards. The decision rendered by the Second Circuit in Iran
Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp.2 9 does not uphold the purpose
of the agreement. Although the New York Convention provides
some exceptions to enforcement of awards,21° these exceptions
have been consistently construed narrowly. The Avco decision
was inconsistent with the prevailing application of the due
process exception. By allowing Avco to successfully use the due
process defense in this case, the Second Circuit has permitted
Avco latitude not granted other respondents who advanced a
similar defense. The inevitable result will be increased litiga-
tion in American courts, with diminished predictability. It has
generally been held that "there should be great hesitation in
upsetting an arbitration award."21' This decision does little to
"unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced.... ,,2 2 and weak-
ens the purpose of the New York Convention.
Cindy Silverstein
208. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
209. 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
210. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
211. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical
Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J. 1976).
212. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
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